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“A Guantánamo on the Sea”:  
The Difficulty of Prosecuting  
Pirates and Terrorists 
Eugene Kontorovich† 
No one wants a Guantánamo on the sea.1 
— Franz Josef Jung, German Defense Minister 
They can’t stop us—we know international law.2 
— Jama Ali, a Somali pirate 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2008, an epidemic of piracy broke out in the Gulf of 
Aden, off the Horn of Africa, with record numbers of ships attacked and 
captured.3 The magnitude of the problem generated a response that on the 
surface appears to be a model of international cooperation. An unprecedented 
naval force, spearheaded by the United States and with contributions from a 
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1. See Germany Calls for International Court to Prosecute Pirates, FoxNews.com, Dec. 
23, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,471804,00.html (explaining why nations today 
are reluctant to act against pirates). 
2. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Outmaneuver Warships off Somalia, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 
2008, at A6 (“Even if foreign navies nab some members of his crew, Mr. Jama said, he is not 
worried. He said his men would probably get no more punishment than a free ride back to the 
beach.”). 
3. In 2008, the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce 
reported an “unprecedented” wave of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, with 111 recorded attacks. See 
ICC Commercial Crime Services, IMB Reports Unprecedented Rise in Maritime Hijackings, Jan. 
16, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imb-
reports-unprecedented-rise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.  
KONTOROVICH 33 POSTAUTHOR 3/18/2010  8:36 AM 
244 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  98:243 
dozen nations, assembled in the Gulf of Aden.4 The U.N. Security Council 
unanimously authorized the use of force against pirates even in sovereign 
Somali territory.5 These developments could be seen as a high point for a new 
international legal order. Yet the international response has failed to control the 
outbreak of piracy.6 The countries policing the Gulf of Aden refuse to attack 
and often even to arrest the pirates. As the U.S. National Security Council 
wrote, “Somali-based piracy is flourishing because it is . . . nearly conse-
quence-free.”7 
The international law regarding piracy provides a uniquely favorable 
framework for its suppression. Under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, 
which for centuries applied only to piracy, any nation can capture and try 
pirates it finds on the high seas.8 Yet none of the countries patrolling the coast 
of Somalia have chosen to exercise this authority.9 The frigates routinely 
apprehend pirates in the act, only to let them go. In at least one case, a North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warship came across suspected pirates in 
a broken boat and, pursuant to international norms concerning “distressed 
mariners,” gave them a tow back to port.10 Several European nations have 
instructed their navies not to make any arrests.11 As a result, a few thousand 
largely illiterate brigands from one of the world’s poorest countries have 
managed, with little more than small arms and rocket-propelled grenades 
 
4. Mike Pfanz, Somali Pirate Attacks “Set to Increase” as Monsoon Eases, Telegraph 
(U.K.), July 27, 2009. 
5. See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 
2008). 
6. See, e.g., Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Op-Ed., Piracy Is Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 
2008, at A33 (observing that the question whether “the Somali pirates [are] ordinary criminals, or 
a quasi-military force . . . . has virtually paralyzed the navies called to police the Gulf of Aden”). 
7. National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 
Partnership & Action Plan 12 (2008) [hereinafter “Countering Piracy”]. 
8. The high seas are all parts of the sea not included in states’ internal waters or territorial 
waters, which extend out 12 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic zone, which extends out 
200 miles. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 3, 56(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397, 400, 418 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. For purposes relevant to piracy, the high seas 
regime applies to the exclusive economic zone as well. See id. art. 56(1) (describing limited 
sovereign rights to natural resources in EEZ), art. 58(2). 
9. See, e.g., John Helmer, Navies Stumped over Pirates off Somalia, Bus. Day, June 3, 
2009, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=72374 (describing 
Russia’s unwillingness to use its universal jurisdiction statute against captured Somali pirates). 
10. Bent Mikkelsen, Pirates Keep the Absalon Busy, Shipping Gazette, Nov. 21, 2008, 
available at http://www.shipgaz.com/old/magazine/issues/2008/22/article2.php; Jeffrey 
Gettleman, Somalia’s Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1; see 
also UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 98(1)(a)–(b). 
11. See Gettleman, supra note 10; Justin Stares, Pirates Protected from EU Task Force by 
Human Rights, Telegraph (London), Nov. 19, 2008; Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK 
Asylum, Times Online, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ 
article3736239.ece. 
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(RPGs),12 to shrug off the efforts of an overwhelming naval force.13 The piracy 
epidemic worsened steadily even after the global armada assembled in the Gulf 
in late 2008.14 
As former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the U.N. 
Security Council, international law provides “sufficient legal authority with 
which to apprehend and prosecute pirates.”15 What is lacking, said Secretary 
Rice, is the “political will and capacity.”16 Various second-order international 
legal rules, norms, and expectations pull in the opposite direction, frustrating 
antipiracy efforts. International rules make detention and prosecution so costly 
that setting pirates loose seems preferable.17  
Many of the legal issues that prevent states from effectively suppressing 
pirates also plague responses to international terrorism. Pirates and terrorists 
fall in the gray zone between military combatants and civilians. Thus the 
antipiracy campaign and the so-called War on Terror both raise questions about 
the legal status of conflicts between states and diffuse armed networks with 
international operations. Issues that have impeded countries’ efforts on both 
these fronts include: potential confusion about pirates’ prisoner of war (POW) 
status, the use of prolonged detention, rendition of suspects to countries with 
poor human rights records, claims of abuse by detainees, the difficulty of 
proving in civilian courts cases arising from active military operations, and the 
legality of “targeted killings” of suspected hostile civilians.  
The legal obstacles come from international humanitarian law, including 
the Geneva Conventions, human rights treaties, international refugee law, the 
 
12. See Jamal Osma, ‘We Are Hungry. There Is No Government, No Economy, So It Is a 
Good Way to Earn Money’, Times (London), Dec. 12, 2008, at 54 (“Pirates are usually in their 
twenties, illiterate, attracted by the prospect of a lucrative life and are prepared to get rich or die 
trying.”). 
13. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 30, 2008, at A6. 
14. See Pfanz, supra note 4. 
15. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-
Based Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight Against Piracy off Coast, Unanimously Adopting 
1851, U.N. Doc. SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release] (statement 
of U.S. Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice). 
16. Id. 
17. See Jim Garamone, Mullen Shocked by Pirate Attack on Supertanker, Am. Forces 
Press Service, Dep’t of Def., Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
newsarticle.aspx?id=51972 (quoting the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “One of the 
challenges that . . . you have in piracy clearly is, if you are intervening and you capture pirates, is 
there a path to prosecute them?”); Nicolas Kulish, Legal Hurdles in West Slow Pursuit of Pirates, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2008, at A8. In the same vein, Denmark, a leading maritime nation, said at a 
U.N. meeting, that dealing with the pirates required “further deliberations on issues with regard to 
detention and prosecution of pirates” and stressed the need for a “clear legal infrastructure, both 
for extradition and prosecution of perpetrators.” See Danish Maritime Authority, Report on 
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U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and other sources. None 
of these measures were designed to obstruct antipiracy efforts; the conventions 
were generally adopted without any thought about a resurgence of high seas 
piracy. But the growth of international legal norms that limit state authority and 
provide greater protections for individuals make it harder for nations to perform 
the oldest and perhaps most basic law enforcement function in international 
law: preventing piracy. 
The failure of the antipiracy campaign offers lessons about one of the 
most prominent and contentious issues of the day: whether the ordinary 
criminal process can effectively deal with alleged, irregular combatants 
captured abroad.18 The Obama administration has begun transferring detainees 
from Guantánamo Bay, where they may have faced military commission 
proceedings, to the mainland for trials before civilian courts.19 The failure of 
similar measures in the battle against piracy suggests some of the difficulties 
those plans might face. Western countries’ refusal to prosecute pirates they 
capture stems from their concern about the difficulties of applying regular 
criminal processes to such irregular forces.  
The Somali piracy problem provides an excellent case study of the effects 
of various international legal rules, because one would expect international law 
to be more effective here than with terrorism and unlawful combatants. Piracy 
is the paradigmatic crime for which international law authorizes and even 
requires universal enforcement and punishment. Terrorism, on the other hand, 
is not an international offense.20 Unlike the War on Terror, the antipiracy 
campaign has not been the subject of intense domestic or international dispute; 
a coalition of diverse states has sent forces to interdict Somali pirates. The only 
state whose sovereign interests are at stake, Somalia, has made clear that it has 
no intention of intervening on behalf of the pirates.21 
Similarly, pirates lack ideological fellow-travelers who might draw 
attention to their cases. Terrorists have political goals and thus sympathizers, 
lobbyists, and often state support. Furthermore, the U.N. Security Council 
resolutions authorized robust action against Somali pirates, both at sea and in 
 
18. Daphne Eviatar, 9/11 Masterminds Could Face Trial in Federal Court, Wash. Indep., 
Oct. 21, 2009, available at http://washingtonindependent.com/64590/911-masterminds-could-
face-trial-in-federal-court; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ 
Court, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2007, at A19. 
19. Obama Plans U.S. Terror Trials to Replace Guantanamo Prisons, USA Today, Nov. 
11, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-11-11-obama-
guantanamo_N.htm. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We . . . further hold 
that customary international law currently does not provide for the prosecution of ‘terrorist’ acts 
under the universality principle, in part due to the failure of States to achieve anything like 
consensus on the definition of terrorism.”).  
21. See S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (noting the Somali government’s approval of the international 
antipiracy effort contemplated by the resolutions).  
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sovereign Somali territory. The Security Council passed five such resolutions 
in 2008,22 more than on any other issue, including the Israeli-Arab conflict.23 
Unlike terrorism, which is often directed at a particular nation, piracy directly 
injures the commerce of the many countries whose trade passes through the 
Gulf of Aden; states suffer direct losses and thus have private incentives to 
intervene. 
Moreover, the practicalities of fighting piracy are less daunting than 
terrorism: pirates have little training, float around the seas in open boats, and 
thus are easier to catch than terrorists. Finally, while Kenya is now hosting 
trials of some captured pirates, many third-party states are not eager to try or 
jail terrorists or other serious international criminals out of fear that their 
friends might retaliate. Even U.S. allies sympathetic to President Obama’s 
planned closure of Guantánamo refused to accept detainees from the base.24 
Similarly, the Netherlands agreed to host the war crimes trial of former 
Liberian President Charles Taylor, but refused to host his imprisonment if he is 
convicted.25 
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I describes the eruption of piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden and the multifaceted international response. Part II outlines 
the powerful international legal tools available to combat piracy. Part III 
explains the countervailing international norms and considerations that have 
undermined the effectiveness of the regime described in Part II. The 
Conclusion places the failure to assert universal jurisdiction against piracy in 
the broader context of universal jurisdiction against higher profile and more 
politically sensitive offenses such as war crimes and genocide.26  
 
22. See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 
2008). 
23. See United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2008, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm. 
24. See Guantanamo Issue Looms Large for Europe, Deutsche Welle, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4059693,00.html (“Many European countries are deeply 
concerned about having people who pose a potential security risk at large.”); Judy Dempsey & 
Stephen Castle, EU Nations Divided On Taking Guantánamo Detainees, Int’l Herald Trib., 
Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/europe/22iht-germany.4.1 
9609842.html; Peter Finn, Administration Makes Progress on Resettling Detainees, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 20, 2009, at A3 (reporting that Uighur detainees have been transferred to Bermuda and 
Palau, but not to European nations); Robert Marquand, Closing Guantánamo: Will Europeans 
Take Detainees?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 23, 2009, at 5. 
25. See Rory Carroll, Charles Taylor Flown to the Hague to Face War Crimes Trial, 
Guardian (London), June 21, 2006, at 23. 
26. This Essay does not advocate any alternative approach to either piracy or transnational 
terror, but rather seeks explain the nature of the legal obstacles common to both. 
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I 
AN OLD PROBLEM REVIVED 
A. The Piracy Epidemic 
A series of spectacular hijackings in the Gulf of Aden propelled Somali 
piracy to the forefront of international attention. In late 2008 and early 2009, 
pirates hijacked a Ukrainian ship carrying battle tanks and arms to Kenya,27 a 
Saudi tanker filled with crude oil,28 a chemical tanker,29 and numerous U.N. 
ships carrying international relief supplies.30 Pirates also fired on an American-
owned cruise liner31 and even seized one of the few U.S.-flagged ships on the 
high seas.32 These are some of the more notorious incidents in a rapidly 
escalating epidemic.33 While attacks on international shipping in the Gulf of 
Aden have only recently received significant public attention, they have been 
escalating since the Somali government collapsed in the early 1990s,34 growing 
in frequency and sophistication beginning in 2005.35 In 2008, the attacks 
increased more than threefold over the previous year.36 The geographic scope 
of the attacks also widened, with hijackings occurring in international waters 
hundreds of miles offshore.37 The number of attacks in the first half of 2009 
exceeded totals for all of 2008, with expectations of a further surge in the fall.38 
 
27. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Capture Tanks and Unwanted Global Notice, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1. 
28. Xan Rice, Pirates Anchor Hijacked Supertanker off Somalia Coast, Guardian 
(London), Nov. 18, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/18/somalia-oil. 
29. Philippine Tanker Hijacked By Pirates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2008, at A14. 
30. Jeevan Vasagar, Pirates Hijack Tsunami Aid Ship, Guardian Unlimited, July 1, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2005/jul/01/internationalaidanddevelopment.internationalnews. 
31. U.S. Cruise Ship Escapes Fire from Pirates in Gulf of Aden, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2008, 
at A14. 
32. Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates; Navy Ship 
Arrives, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2009, at A6. 
33. See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Servs., Pirate 
Attacks off Somalia Already Surpass 2008 Figures (2009), available at http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-somalia-already-
surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.  
34. See Gettleman, supra note 10.  
35. Peter Lehr & Hendrick Lehmann, Somalia—Pirates’ New Paradise, in Violence at 
Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism 1–3, 16 (Peter Lehr ed., 2007). 
36. Roughly 111 ships were attacked in 2008. Int’l Chamber of Commerce 
Commercial Crime Servs., supra note 33. 
37. The Sirius Star, a Liberian-flagged oil tanker hijacked in November 2008, was on its 
way around the Cape of Good Hope—not through the Suez Canal—when it was hijacked more 
than 450 nautical miles from shore. Robert F. Worth, Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker off Kenya, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 18, 2008, at A6. 
38. Gregory Viscusi, Somali Piracy to Pick Up After Monsoon, Task Force Chief Says, 
Bloomberg, July 27, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid= 
aDZfefl5fcpM (noting that twenty-eight of the attacks succeeded in seizing a ship); Pfanz, supra 
note 4.  
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The September 2008 hijacking of the arms-laden Faina triggered a new 
level of international concern. “With the seizure of the Ukrainian ship,” said the 
U.N. Special Representative for Somalia, “a new line has been crossed. This act 
should not and will not be rewarded.”39 The U.S. Navy diverted several vessels 
from counterterrorism operations to corner the ship.40 One officer wryly noted 
that in the pursuit, there was one destroyer for each pirate.41 Despite being 
surrounded, the pirates eventually received a multimillion-dollar ransom and 
escaped.42 
The U.N. Security Council responded with a series of resolutions that 
authorized increasingly broad encroachments into Somali territory. On 
December 16, 2008, the Council passed its strongest resolution,43 drafted and 
promoted by the United States, which extended previous authorizations of 
military force to operations on the Somali mainland. This gave coalition navies 
a tool that pirate hunters have lacked for centuries44 and marked the first time 
the Council authorized armed action against pirates in sovereign territory. 
B. The Grand Armada 
In response to the piracy problem, NATO nations, along with other 
powers, began sending warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden.45 By the end of 
2008, twenty-three nations had committed vessels.46 The force was augmented 
by the first naval force ever deployed by the European Union (EU),47 as well as 
 
39. See Press Release, U.N. Political Office for Somalia, Somalia: SRSG Statement on 
Piracy (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-
7JXLA7?OpenDocument. 
40. Jamey Keaten, Developed Countries Push Back vs. Pirates, Associated Press, Oct. 4, 
2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/04/europe/EU-BattlingPiracy.php?page 
=1. 
41. See John Patch, The Overstated Threat, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proceedings, Dec. 2008, at 
34–39. 
42. Jeffery Gettleman & Mohammed Ibrahim, Somali Pirates Get Ransom and Leave Arms 
Freighter, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2009, at A6. 
43. See S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter allows the Security Council to respond to threats to international peace by a variety of 
means, including authorizing military force. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41–42. Concerns raised by 
other Council members led the United States to withdraw draft language referring to operations in 
Somali “airspace,” though the United States maintained that the resolution still permitted entry 
into Somali airspace for bombing and missile strikes. See U.S. Says Piracy Resolution Allows for 
Air Strikes in Somalia, Agence France Press, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.infowars.com/us-says-
piracy-resolution-allows-for-air-strikes-in-somalia/. 
44. See, e.g., Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars 237–45 (2003) (explaining that, during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain and the United States were unable to stamp out 
Caribbean pirates because, among other things, they lacked Spanish permission to seek out land-
based hideouts in Cuba and other islands).  
45. Keaten, supra note 40.  
46. Xan Rice, U.S. Launches Anti-Piracy Naval Force to Combat Hijackings off Somalia, 
Guardian Unlimited, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/09/piracy-
somalia-us-navy. 
47. Richard Norton-Taylor, British Warship to Lead EU Armada into Gulf of Aden, 
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Russian and Indian warships48 and the first modern Chinese naval deployment 
to another region.49 Yet, the results so far are not encouraging. Despite these 
international efforts, the pirates still threaten to scare shipping away from a 
waterway that carries 7.5 percent of the world’s seaborne trade and 30 percent 
of Europe’s oil.50  
Pirate attacks have grown even bolder since the international enforcement 
efforts began.51 At a U.N. Security Council meeting in December 2008, world 
leaders admitted that their antipiracy efforts had failed. While the international 
community had done “quite a lot,” the Russian Foreign Minister observed, 
“piracy went unpunished.”52 Secretary Rice agreed, saying pirates enjoyed 
“impunity,” partially because of the problems with “the detention and 
prosecution of captured pirates.”53 
A U.S. Coast Guard admiral recently summarized the problems for 
Congress: 
Somali pirates to date have suffered few consequences, even when 
they were apprehended. Frequently, the navies or other forces that 
apprehended pirates were from states outside the region, and faced 
significant legal . . . challenges . . . if they wished to bring pirates to 
justice in their courts. Thus, pirates are often not held accountable for 
their crimes and quickly make their way back to the Somali coast 
where they continue their piratical activities.54 
Similarly, the pirates lack reservations about capturing civilian crews. In 2008, 
pirates took 815 crew members hostage off the coast of Africa; in the first half 
of 2009, another 561 were taken hostage and 6 were killed.55 Subsequent Parts 
will show how the naval campaign’s failure to combat these attacks can be 
attributed in part to a lack of a legal basis for initiating hostilities against 
 
Guardian (London), Nov. 20, 2008, at 29. 
48. Viscusi, supra note 38. 
49. Mark McDonald, Chinese Warships Sail, Loaded for Pirates, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 
2008, at A6. 
50. BBC News, The Suez Crisis: Key Maps, July 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/middle_east/5195068.stm (“About 7.5% of world sea trade is carried via the canal today.”); 
Somali Pirates Risk Choking Key World Trade Route, Reuters, Apr. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE53E2JR20090415 (“Around 30% of Europe’s 
oil goes through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.”).  
51. Nick Wadhams, As Somali Pirates Get Bolder, Policing Them Gets Tougher, 
Time.com, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1860404,00.html. 
52. S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release, supra note 15 (statement of Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Sergei Lavrov). 
53. Id. (statement of U.S. Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice). 
54. International Piracy on the High Seas: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Coast 
Guard & Maritime Transportation, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Rear Admiral William 
Baumgartner) [hereinafter Baumgartner Statement]. 
55. World Pirate Attacks More Than Double This Year, SeattleTimes.Com, July 15, 
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009472715_apaspiracyworldattacks. 
html. As of this writing, pirates continued to hold nearly 200 crewmembers from 11 vessels. Lori 
Johnston, Q & A on the News, Atlanta J.-Const., July 21, 2009, at 2A.  
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suspected pirates and daunting obstacles in prosecuting them.56 
It bears noting that, in four instances, captured Somali pirates were taken 
to Western countries for trial—but only when they specifically attacked that 
state’s vessels. In one case, pirates seized a French yacht. Paris responded with 
extraordinary vigor, sending commandos into the mainland of Somalia to 
identify the pirates, and bringing them back to Paris for trial.57 Similarly, the 
Netherlands is trying a group of pirates that attacked a Dutch-flagged vessel,58 
and the United States is prosecuting the surviving pirate from the hijacking of 
the Maersk Alabama, an American cargo ship.59 This suggests nations are 
willing to accept the burden of prosecuting pirates when it involves their direct 
and immediate interests—but not when it involves universal jurisdiction.  
II 
LEGAL TOOLS FOR FIGHTING PIRACY 
A. Universal Jurisdiction 
International law gives ample license for pursuing and prosecuting 
pirates.60 For hundreds of years, international law has treated the pirate as a 
hostis humani generis—an enemy of all mankind.61 Several factors account for 
pirates’ special jurisdictional treatment.62 Pirates, by definition, do not 
 
56. See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 10; Jason Keyser, Guarded Shipping Corridor Limiting 
Somali Piracy, Associated Press, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
world/2008-11-10-3512568313_x.htm (reporting that sixty pirates have been released since 
October 2008 alone “because no country has been willing to bring them to trial”); Mikkelsen, 
supra note 10. 
57. France Raid Ship After Crew Freed, BBC News, Apr. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/africa/7342292.stm. 
58. Bruno Waterfield, Somali Pirates Embrace Capture as Route to Europe, Telegraph 
(U.K.), May 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/5350183/Somali-
pirates-embrace-capture-as-route-to-Europe.html. The Danish Navy captured and held the 
suspects, but Denmark would not exercise universal jurisdiction over piracy. Sebastiaan Gottlieb, 
The Dutch Want Pirates in Court, Radio Netherlands, Jan. 16, 2009, 
http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/090116-piracy-trial.  
59. Joseph Goldstein, Makin’ ‘em Walk the Plank, A.B.A. J., July 2009, at 16–17. The 
United States charged the alleged pirate with additional attacks against other, unidentified but 
presumably non-American vessels. See Benjamin Weiser, Somali Man Is Charged in 2 More Ship 
Hijackings, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2010, at A26. Given the existing charges of piracy against an 
American vessel, the additional charges can be thought of as “pendent” or “supplemental” 
universal jurisdiction, rather than naked universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The 
“Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 149, 
180 (2009) (explaining unusual American piracy prosecution from the 1790s as a possible 
example of pendent universal jurisdiction).  
60. S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release, supra note 15 (statement of U.S. Sec’y of State 
Condoleezza Rice) (observing that international treaties gave “sufficient legal authority with 
which to apprehend and prosecute pirates, but that political will and capacity was often lacking”). 
61. See Edward Coke, 3 Institutes on the Laws of England 113 (1797); Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise § 272, at 325–26 (1905); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 34 cmt. b (1965). 
62. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What 
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discriminate among targets based on nationality and thus endanger the trade of 
all countries.63 Their attacks also raise the prices of commodities, so that even 
nations not directly involved in shipping suffer.64 Moreover, cargo ships are 
usually owned by a corporation in one state, fly the flag of a second state, and 
carry cargo destined for multiple other states. Further, ships often are crewed 
by people from still other states.65 Piracy implicates the interests of all of those 
countries. 
Equally important, pirates are not endorsed by their home countries.66 
This means that when some other state seeks to prosecute them, his or her own 
country will likely not protest. Based on the example of piracy, modern human 
rights law has attempted to extend universal jurisdiction to crimes with political 
motivations and governmental perpetrators, such as war crimes and torture.67 
Doing so has often raised the hackles of defendants’ home governments.68 By 
contrast, no home government has much solicitude for pirates, who are 
considered mere robbers. 
B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
ratified by almost every country in the world, codifies the universal jurisdiction 
status of piracy.69 UNCLOS defines piracy more broadly than did the 
customary law of nations by including “any illegal acts of violence or deten-
tion, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends.”70 Thus, UNCLOS 
makes assault and murder on the high seas universally punishable. Under the 
 
Piracy Teaches About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 111, 139–53 
(2004) (explaining the reasons that piracy was a universal jurisdiction offense). 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that 
piracy has long been subject to universal jurisdiction in part “because of the threat that piracy 
poses to orderly transport and commerce between nations”). 
64. For example, the November 2008 hijacking of a Saudi Oil tanker that held two million 
barrels of oil (more than one quarter of Saudi Arabia’s daily exports) helped to raise global oil 
prices more than one dollar, to fifty-eight dollars a barrel. See Raissa Kaslowsky & Simon Webb, 
Somali Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker Carrying $100 Million in Oil, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 2008, at 
A24. 
65. Id. (“A single piratical attack often affects the interests of numerous countries, 
including the flag State of the vessel, various States of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, 
regional coastal States, owner States, and cargo owner, transshipment, and destination States.”). 
66. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 
785, 793 (1988). 
67. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s 
Hollow Foundation, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 183, 184, 197–207 (2004). 
68. See, e.g., Edward Wong, China Protests U.S. Rights Suit Against a Leader, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 5, 2000, at A4. 
69. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105. For the comprehensive list of ratifications, see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20 
United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea. 
70. Id. art. 101(a). While the United States has not ratified the third and most recent version 
of UNCLOS, it is party to an earlier incarnation with identical piracy provisions. See Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
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older customary norm, only robbery counted as piracy, and thus more severe 
crimes, such as murder, fell outside the scope of international law.71 
UNCLOS also requires nations to combat piracy. The drafters’ 
commentary stresses that “any State having an opportunity [to take] measures 
against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it 
by international law.”72 It also favorably cites the Harvard Draft Convention on 
Piracy, which went so far as to state that legal claims could be brought against 
any nation that does not take sufficient steps to bring pirates to justice.73 Yet 
Article 105 makes clear that prosecution itself is not obligatory.74 
In some ways, however, UNCLOS makes fighting piracy more difficult.75 
The central provisions of the treaty extend nations’ territorial seas to twelve 
miles from the coast, a significant expansion of the traditional three-mile 
zone.76 Because the international law of piracy applies only on the “high seas,” 
UNCLOS has the unintended effect of reducing the area where piracy can be 
internationally policed.77 This change allows pirates to take advantage of the 
territorial waters of weak or failed states. The expanded territorial waters cause 
even greater problems in gulfs, straits, and archipelagoes, where international 
shipping must pass through an area bounded on several sides by sovereign 
waters. Almost all Somali pirate attacks against international shipping take 
place far outside that country’s twelve-mile territorial sea,78 and thus this 
feature of UNCLOS cannot be seen as facilitating their activities. Moreover, 
the Security Council has authorized international forces to “enter the territorial 
 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Furlong, 618 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
72. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 GAOR 
Supp. (No. 9) at art. 38 cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
Comm’n 253, at 282, A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l [hereinafter Report of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n]. 
73. See id. art. 38 cmt. 1, at 282; see also Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention 
and Comment on Piracy, 26 Am. J. Int’l L. 739 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter Harvard Draft 
Convention]. 
74. See Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the 
Coast of Somalia, 30 Eur. J. Int’l L. 399, 408 (2009); NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The 
Growing Threat of Privacy to Regional and Global Security, 169 CDS 09 E ¶ 37 
(2009), available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770. 
75. For other potential complications related to UNCLOS, see infra notes 111, 206–210 
and accompanying text.  
76. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 3; see Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to 
International Law 216–22 (describing transition from three- to twelve-mile seas). 
77. Martin Murphy, Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional States 
Combat Piracy?, in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism 161–63 (Peter 
Lehr ed., 2007). 
78. Two of the leading piracy problem areas are the Gulf of Aden (located in the Arabian 
Sea between Somalia and Yemen) and the Straits of Malacca (in the Indian Ocean between 
Malaysia and Singapore), both chokepoints for international shipping. See Dep’t of Energy, 
Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Jan. 
2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html 
(listing both the Strait of Malacca and Bab el Mandeb, the narrow strait separating the Gulf of 
Aden and the Red Sea, as “world oil transit chokepoints”). 
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waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy” and to “use . . . 
all necessary means to repress act of piracy.”79 
C. The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Treaty 
An additional source of jurisdiction, which partially overlaps with 
UNCLOS and existing international law concerning piracy, is the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA).80 SUA has 156 signatories, whose merchant marines 
comprise roughly 95 percent of the world’s shipping tonnage.81 The U.N. 
Security Council resolutions on Somali piracy have stressed the availability of 
jurisdiction under SUA.82 Prosecution solely under the treaty, however, has 
been limited to a single obscure case against a deranged cook who 
commandeered a fishing trawler.83  
SUA requires these signatories84 to prosecute anyone who “seizes or 
exercises control over a ship by force or threat of force or any other form of 
intimidation.”85 Jurisdiction is also readily available for countries whose 
nationals are seized, threatened, injured, or killed during an attack.86 SUA has 
certain advantages over UNCLOS as a basis for jurisdiction. First, it covers acts 
in territorial waters, not just on the high seas.87 Second, it makes the exercise of 
jurisdiction mandatory in some circumstances.88 Yet while SUA “obliges 
contracting governments either to extradite alleged offenders or submit cases to 
their competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,” refusing to take 
custody of pirates in the first place prevents such obligations from attaching. 
UNCLOS, in contrast, requires nations to take active measures against piracy, 
but does not mandate prosecution.89 A combination of the two treaties, 
however, could require states to prosecute in some instances. Some states 
 
79. S.C. Res. 1816, art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). 
80. 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), entered into force 1992 (also known as the “Rome Convention”). 
The treaty was enacted in response to the Achille Lauro hijacking of 1985, in which Palestinian 
terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise liner, having come on board as passengers. See Malvina 
Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on 
Maritime Safety, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 269, 270–72 (1988). 
81. See Int’l Maritime Org., Summary of Status of Convention: As of 31 January 2010, 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247. 
82. See, e.g., Sec. Res. 1846, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
83. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Eugene Kontorovich, 
International Decisions—United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 103 Am. J. Int’l. L. 734 (2009). 
84. 27 I.L.M. 668 art. 6(4). 
85. Id. art. 3(a).  
86. Id. art. 6(2)(b). 
87. See id. art. 4. 
88. SUA also explicitly gives jurisdiction over covered offenses to all signatory nations, 
regardless of the nationality of the vessels involved. See id. art. 6(4). See also infra notes 207–19 
and accompanying text. 
89. See Treves, supra note 74, at 408; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 74 
169 CDS 09 E ¶ 37 (2009). 
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implement UNCLOS’s duty to “cooperate . . . in the repression of piracy” by 
taking police measures against piracy.90 If patrolling states that are SUA 
signatories take pirates into custody, they would then have a duty to extradite or 
punish.  
D. Trials in Other Countries 
Although nations patrolling the Gulf of Aden have resisted bringing 
pirates into their domestic courts, they have looked for other places to send 
them. In 2006, the United States sent a group of pirates captured by the USS 
Churchill to Kenya for trial in a closely watched test case.91 While their trials 
eventually occurred without major complications and the pirates were 
convicted,92 such transfers did not immediately become regular procedure in 
Kenya. At the height of the piracy surge in December 2008, however, Britain 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Kenya, formalizing an 
arrangement whereby captured pirates would be turned over to the latter for 
trial.93 In the subsequent months, the United States, the EU, and Denmark 
entered into similar arrangements with Kenya94 As of mid-2009, roughly one 
hundred pirates had been transferred to Kenya.95 
Western nations see Kenya as conveniently situated to become an 
informal regional piracy court.96 Yet Kenya is at best a stopgap solution. 
Officials in Nairobi have made clear that their willingness to accept pirates is 
limited.97 Kenya does not relish doing the rest of the world’s dirty work.98 The 
detention and prosecution of hundreds of foreign Muslims who have committed 
 
90. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 100.  
91. Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for 
Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 36 (2007). 
92. See id.; James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, 
World Pol’y J., Winter 2008, at 46–47 (noting pirates received seven-year sentences). 
93. Foreign & Commonwealth Office (U.K), Prisoner Transfer Agreements, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-prevention/piracy/acks. 
94. David Morgan, U.S. Delivers Seven Somali Pirate Suspects to Kenya, Reuters, Mar. 5, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE52480N20090305. 
95. See Catherine Philp, Captured Somali Pirates Are Being Dumped in Kenya, Officials 
Say, Times (London), June 12, 2009, at 41; see also Celestine Achieng, U.S. Navy Hands over 17 
Pirates to Kenya, Reuters, June 10, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/ 
idUSLA1052558.  
96. Jeffrey Gettleman, The West Turns to Kenya as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 24, 2009, at A8.  
97. James Butty, Kenyan Foreign Minister Sheds Light on U.S.-Kenya Piracy Agreement, 
Turkish Weekly, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/63755/kenyan-
foreign-minister-shed-light-on-u-s-kenya-piracy-agreement-.html (quoting Kenyan foreign 
minister as saying the Memorandum of Agreement with the United States is “not an open door for 
dumping pirates onto Kenya soil because it will not be acceptable”). 
98. Id.; James Thuo Gathii, Kenya Has No Duty to Try Pirates Arrested Elsewhere, Bus. 
Daily (Nairobi), Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://multimedia.marsgroupkenya.org/?StoryID= 
252749&page=3&p=Lari (noting that trying pirates in Kenyan courts will slow domestic trials, 
and describing Kenya’s agreements with Western states as efforts by the latter to “offshore” their 
responsibilities for prosecuting pirates to Kenya). 
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no particular crime against Kenya threatens to irritate its relations with 
Somalia’s and its own Muslim populations.99 So far, however, patrolling 
nations have been unsuccessful in their efforts to find other nearby states to 
host piracy prosecutions.100 Indeed, the Seychelles, often mentioned as a 
possible forum,101 has reportedly refused to prosecute pirates to prevent 
reprisals against its nationals and vessels.102 The limitations of national 
prosecutions have led some states to call for the creation of a specialized 
international court, though such action seems far off.103  
III 
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO FIGHTING PIRACY 
While international law has developed to include many new crimes, the 
successful prosecution of piracy has grown more difficult than it was in the age 
when ships were powered by sails. Although international law obligates nations 
to repress piracy, many legal rules, practical constraints, and other considera-
tions pull states in the opposite direction. These tensions involve conflicts 
between older rules designed to promote international security and newer ones 
aimed at protecting individuals from abuse by state authority. While some of 
the legal problems discussed here are hypothetical, they can have a real chilling 
effect on actions by American and other Western officials.104  
 
99. Celestine Achieng, U.S. Navy Hands over 17 Pirates to Kenya, Reuters, June 10, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSLA1052558 (reporting on 
tensions with Kenyan Muslims caused by the prosecutions). 
100. Barney Jopson, Kenya Signs Deal to Prosecute Somali Pirates, Fin. Times, Dec. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b63b8e6-c7c4-11dd-b611-000077b07658.html? 
nclick_check=1. 
101. Elizabeth Pineau, France Asks Seychelles to Help with Pirate Trials, Reuters, Oct. 
18, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSLI622681. 
102. Kim Sengupta, Is Seychelles Turning a Blind Eye to Pirates?, Oct. 28, 2009, 
Independent (London), at 2; J.E. Dyer, They Sell Pirates in the Seychelles, Contentions, 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/j-e-dyer/139812. 
103. See S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release, supra note 15 (statement of Danish Ambassador 
Carston Staur); id. (statement of U.S. Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice); Frank Gardner, How Do 
You Tackle Piracy?, BBC News, Dec. 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7782016.stm 
(reporting that U.S. and French officers at a conference on piracy called for creation of 
international court and prison for pirates); Germany Calls for International Court to Prosecute 
Pirates, FoxNews.com, Dec. 23, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,471804,00.html; 
David Osler, Russia Calls for a Piracy Court, Lloyd’s List, May 14, 2009, 
http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/archive/2009/may/weekly-edition-14th-of-may-2009/russia-
calls-for-a-piracy-court. 
104. Currently, several former Bush administration officials face threats of prosecution for 
their decisions surrounding the classification and treatment of suspected terrorist detainees. See, 
e.g., Mark Benjamin, How to Build A Torture Commission, Salon.com, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/03/04/torture_commission/index.html; Editorial, A 
Truth Commission for the Bush Era?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2009, at A12; Bobby Ghosh, Leahy’s 
Plan to Probe Bush-Era Wrongdoings, Time.com, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/ 
nation/article/0,8599,1879810,00.html. Their successors in office may be reluctant to take actions 
that redound principally to the benefit of international shipping if there is even a small chance that 
they may later be held criminally liable. 
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A. Pirates as Civilians 
Modern international law precludes the classic and most obvious 
antipiracy measure: killing them. Under the classic law of nations, pirates were 
simultaneously criminals and military targets. They were hostis humani 
generis—enemies of all mankind—in the military sense, as well as offenders of 
international law.105 They had the disabilities of both combatants and criminals, 
without the privileges or immunities of either class. They could be tried when 
captured, unlike regular combatants, but if encountered on the high seas, they 
could be attacked and slain.106 Moreover, international law recognized that 
returning pirates to port for trial could be extremely burdensome, and thus it 
permitted summary shipboard proceedings and executions.107 In short, pirates 
had a status much like unlawful combatants: they could be dealt with either 
militarily or criminally at the enforcing state’s convenience. 
Under modern international law, the situation is reversed. By the 1930s, 
Western lawyers declared that anything short of a full trial or court martial was 
“inconsistent with the spirit of modern jurisprudence.”108 Moreover, pirates are 
considered civilians.109 Modern human rights and humanitarian law prohibits 
extrajudicial killing of civilians except in self-defense.110 UNCLOS, a 
codification of the modern law of the high seas, stipulates that the criminal 
justice system is the only way of dealing with pirates.111 So, except in situations 
of immediate self-defense, naval forces are prohibited from killing pirates and 
must instead seek to apprehend them. 
Given that pirates are civilians on board civilian vessels, patrolling navies 
can do little until the suspects attempt to board another ship. International law 
does not criminalize being on a Somali fishing vessel, even if the only pieces of 
“fishing equipment” on board are AK-47s and RPGs. Consequently, navies 
 
105. See Coke, supra note 61, at 113; Oppenheim, supra note 61, § 272, at 325–26 (1905). 
106. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 71 (1838) (“As 
therefore he has renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself to 
the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war 
against him[.]”); Oppenheim, supra note 61, § 278, at 330. 
107. See Oppenheim, supra note 61, § 278, at 330. 
108. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 853 (disagreeing with support for 
summary proceedings expressed in draft report by League of Nations committee of experts). 
109. See Treves, supra note 74, at 412–13; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 89, 
¶ 40. 
110. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(1) (Third 
Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Common Article 2]; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13 (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 (banning attacks on civilians); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 6(1)–(2), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (prohibiting extrajudicial killing). While the 
Geneva Conventions do not necessarily apply to conflicts with pirates on the high seas, the 
minimal obligations of Common Article 3 are widely thought to be generally applicable to all uses 
of military force as a matter of customary law. 
111. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105. 
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must stop pirates in the narrow window when they speed toward a vessel and 
have not yet taken the ship and its crew hostage. Once the pirates control a 
vessel, responding nations and owners face overwhelming pressure to negotiate 
with them. 
The U.N. Security Council has expanded military avenues for combating 
pirates, demonstrating that nations no longer regard the purely criminal 
approach to piracy as satisfactory. The United States has won Security Council 
approval for airstrikes of the kind it controversially uses against alleged 
terrorists in Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan.112 However, the Security Council 
resolution requires that military action comport with international law.113 This 
suggests that the resolution either does very little or that international 
humanitarian law allows for targeted killings. Notably, the U.N. Security 
Council opened the door to such action despite the harsh criticism of targeted 
killings from the United Nations and human rights groups in nonpiracy 
contexts, like terrorism.114 
Forcefully dealing with pirates creates a serious risk that responding 
nations will be accused of violating international humanitarian law. Attacking 
pirate vessels on the high seas could open nations to accusations of illegal 
“targeted killings” of civilians.115 In recent years international lawyers and 
nongovernmental organizations have increasingly scrutinized tactical military 
decisions for proportionality and other indicia of legality.116 In wars against 
nonuniformed combatants and terrorist groups (so-called nonstate irregulars), 
national forces have been accused of violating humanitarian law for not 
successfully distinguishing between combatants and civilians in environments 
where the former freely commingle with the latter.117 Such considerations have 
undoubtedly deterred nations from using the Security Council authorization to 
attack Somali pirates on land. Indeed, an American admiral in the Gulf of Aden 
criticized the Security Council resolution as being likely to cause high civilian 
casualties given the difficulty of distinguishing pirates from anyone else.118 
 
112. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851, ¶ 6 
(Dec. 16, 2008). 
113. Id. 
114. Such charges have plagued the United States and Israel in their campaigns against 
terrorists. See, e.g., Laura Blumenfeld, In Israel, A Divisive Struggle over Targeted Killing, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 2006, at A1.  
115. Id. 
116. See, e.g., B’Tselem, Attacks on Israeli Civilians by Palestinians: Israel’s Obligations 
in Responding to Rocket and Mortar Fire, http://www.btselem.org/english/Israeli_Civilians/ 
Israels_obligations.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
117. See id. 
118. Lolita C. Baldor & Anne Gearan, Navy Commander Questions Land Attacks on 
Pirates, Assoc. Press, Dec. 13, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
wireStory?id=6454447; see also Frank Gardner, How Do You Tackle Piracy?, BBC News, Dec. 
13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7782016.stm (The United States “did not yet have 
enough intelligence on which individuals were involved to go after them without causing civilian 
casualties”). 
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Such concerns have proven warranted. In November 2008, India reported that 
one of its frigates had sunk a pirate mother ship in the Gulf of Aden. News 
soon emerged that the vessel was in fact a Thai fishing trawler that had been 
captured by pirates; only one of the sixteen crewmembers survived.119 
B. Pirates as Combatants  
Given that combat operations against pirates are unlikely, judicial 
remedies are seemingly the most promising alternative. Yet, as the next two 
Parts describe, numerous obstacles stand in the way. Although pirates have not 
been treated as combatants under the UNCLOS regime, Somali pirates could 
perhaps claim combatant status with its attendant Geneva Convention 
protections, especially in light of developments in international humanitarian 
law over the past decade in relation to nonstate irregulars. Thus, the status of 
pirates under the Conventions poses many of the same problems faced in 
dealing with al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations. The goal 
here is not to defend the merits of such a characterization. Rather, it is to show 
that there are arguments available to the pirates similar to those that have been 
taken seriously in the context of al Qaeda detainees. Even if these legal claims 
are ultimately not viable, their mere assertion by suspected pirates would 
impede prosecution and increase the costs of detention. Thus, these issues may 
help explain the lack of Western prosecution.  
Both al Qaeda and the pirates engage in organized armed attacks, often 
within the context of a broader conflict—like Afghanistan, for example. Yet 
they do not fall naturally within the basic parameters of the Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which contemplates 
traditional armies and well-organized militia forces.120 The drafters of the 
Conventions had in mind neither large-scale international terrorism, which had 
not developed at the time, nor large-scale piracy, which was thought to be a 
thing of the past.121 
Article 4(a)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention does recognize the role of 
irregular “militias,” “organized resistance movements,” and “other volunteer 
corps” so long as they abide by the laws of war and conduct themselves like a 
traditional military organization.122 In the absence of these conditions, the Bush 
administration declared al Qaeda beyond the protections of the Third Geneva 
Convention. The response to that decision, perhaps the most widely criticized 
international legal action of the past decade,123 suggests denying POW status to 
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pirates would not be simple. Moreover, the United States previously extended 
Geneva Convention protections to pirates without conceding that they were 
legally entitled to them.124 
Pirates satisfy the Article 4 requirements better than al Qaeda does. Pirates 
have some local command structure, evidenced by the participation of dozens 
of men in complicated seizures and their ability to divide large amounts of 
ransom peaceably.125 Indeed, unlike ordinary criminal groups, they even have 
spokesmen.126 Pirates carry arms openly, as the Geneva Convention requires of 
militias, resistance movements, and other non-national forces.127 And while 
they do not observe all the rules and customs of war, they often treat captured 
crews reasonably, providing a basis for the argument that they would abide by 
the rules of reciprocity. Few would argue that Article 4 requires perfect 
observance of the laws of war for Geneva protections to apply.128 Such a 
standard would make the Article a dead letter. 
A broader question is whether pirates can be considered militias or other 
organized resistance movements, and not just bandits. The situation in Somalia 
is even more chaotic than Afghanistan in 2001. Because many Somali pirates 
are based out of one of the two de facto independent provinces that have peeled 
away from Somalia, it is very difficult to determine who, if anyone, falls under 
Article 4’s definition of POWs.129  
Furthermore, some pirates have claimed a political purpose: to drive away 
foreign vessels that have intruded on Somali fishing grounds and dumped 
poisonous waste.130 Normally the Somali navy would do this, but it no longer 
exists.131 This account has an element of truth. When the Somali government 
collapsed in 1991, commercial fishing fleets from around the world plundered 
Somalia’s tuna-rich waters.132 Pirates often cite France and Spain as the worst 
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offenders when it comes to toxic waste dumping and illegal fishing.133 Of 
course, the pirates have not limited their attacks to fishing or dumping; indeed, 
they largely attack freighters. And they demand money, not political changes.  
Yet their pretensions have received some international support. Muammar 
al-Gaddafi, the Libyan leader whose nation headed the African Union at the 
time, defended the idea of pirates as freedom fighters: “It is a response to 
greedy Western nations, who invade and exploit Somalia’s water resources 
illegally . . . . It is not a piracy, it is self defence [sic]. It is defending the 
Somalia children’s food.”134 In this version, pirates sound a little bit like 
“[i]nhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading force, without having had 
time to form themselves into regular armed units,” who can enjoy POW protec-
tions under the Third Geneva Convention.135 Indeed, as Western efforts against 
the pirates increase one might expect to hear more such self-defense claims. 
Apart from issues concerning the pirates’ status as combatants, there are 
major preliminary doubts about whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the 
Gulf of Aden situation at all, in particular whether the crisis in the region 
qualifies as an “armed conflict between . . . High Contracting Parties.”136 
Armed conflict is distinguished from “isolated and sporadic acts of violence”137 
and “banditry.”138 There is a strong argument that an international armed 
conflict exists in Somalia. Ethiopia, with the backing of the United States, 
invaded Somalia in 2006 to overthrow an Islamicist movement and install a 
transitional government.139 Ethiopian troops withdrew in January 2009, leaving 
behind a contingent of African Union peacekeepers, who have been caught up 
in bloody three-way fighting that shows no signs of stopping.140 
Even if an armed conflict exists in Somalia, it is not clear that it extends 
outside of Somali waters and into the high seas. Also, pirates captured by 
nations patrolling international waters may not have “fallen into the power of 
the enemy” within the meaning of Article 4.141 The uncertainty about the scope 
of the armed conflict seems, if anything, less acute than similar questions raised 
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by the capture of alleged Islamic terrorists held by the United States. They were 
seized in a variety of countries, often far away from any fighting.142 Thus, 
while Article 4’s conditions may not be strictly satisfied, countries may still 
feel the need to afford at least some Geneva protections to captured pirates. 
Crucially, the Geneva Conventions apply in situations of uncertainty. 
Article 5 provides that when there is “doubt” about whether a person captured 
committing a “belligerent act” is entitled to POW status, such a person shall 
enjoy POW status “until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.”143 Thus, captured pirates could demand a hearing to assert 
their POW status, and in the meantime would have to be treated as POWs.144 
Because POW status is an individualized and highly fact-specific inquiry, each 
pirate or group of pirates would likely require separate determinations.145 The 
Geneva Conventions do not specify the requirements for determining POW 
status. Consequently, United States courts have debated the issues extensively 
in dealing with Guantánamo detainees. Such tribunals would be faced with the 
novel legal and fact-specific issues about combatant status discussed above. 
While POW status would not prevent pirates from being prosecuted for attacks 
on civilian shipping, the added judicial procedures would increase the 
uncertainty and cost involved in apprehending pirates. 
C. Pirates as Defendants 
International law encourages international prosecution of pirates.146 
However, some developments in international and Western legal norms make 
detention and prosecution difficult and potentially embarrassing for the forum 
state, much like the prosecutions of suspected terrorists. Difficulties center on 
establishing and proving who is a pirate. Unlike ordinary criminals, pirates are 
captured by military forces operating in the field. Moreover, pirates neither fly 
the Jolly Roger nor wear eye patches. Just as suspects detained by the United 
States might not actually be terrorists or unlawful combatants, similar 
misidentifications can occur when apprehending suspected pirates at sea. 
Furthermore, the judicial determination of pirate status places additional 
burdens on military forces. 
Because there have been almost no prosecutions so far of pirates in 
domestic courts, it is difficult to assess the costs and obstacles involved in such 
efforts—though the unwillingness of nations even to try suggests the problems 
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are significant.147 Several precedents show some of the likely obstacles. In 
2006, U.S. warships captured Somali pirates and turned them over to Kenya for 
trial.148 The U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer who coordinated 
the 2006 prosecution has described it in great detail.149 Kenya also took custody 
of over 100 pirates captured by the United States and other countries between 
2008 and 2009.150 Additionally, the United States has convicted a foreign 
national under SUA for crimes against a foreign vessel.151 While the case itself 
was of little international importance,152 the extraordinary measures taken to 
prosecute a single defendant show why nations have not been interested in 
prosecuting pirates. The following subsections discuss three of the largest 
hurdles to domestic prosecution of pirates: (1) proving “pirate” status, (2) the 
costs of trial, and (3) the potential embarrassments in detaining suspects. 
1. Status as Pirates 
Universal jurisdiction applies only to pirates. Captured Somalis insist in 
court that they are not pirates but rather simple fishermen, erroneously seized 
by a foreign navy.153 Because many pirates are in fact fishermen, their claim is 
actually somewhat plausible.154 Piracy is not a full-time job.155 Simply having 
weapons on a boat would not distinguish the pirates from many other seafarers 
near Somalia. Furthermore, establishing the identity or even nationality of 
captured individuals will be difficult, as they are unlikely to possess 
identification.156 
 
147. The same can be said about using civilian courts for Guantánamo detainees, a 
development currently in its infancy. 
148. Press Release, U.S. Embassy to Kenya, Capture of Suspected Somali Pirates, Feb. 2, 
2006, http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/pr_20060202.html.  
149. See Bahar, supra note 91, at 41. 
150. Sarah McGregor, Aid Group to Defend Somali Piracy Suspects, Ensure Fair Trials, 
Bloomberg, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid 
=a5wQ7mzHZEEY; Sarah McGregor, Somali Pirates’ Kenya Trial, Bloomberg, Aug. 7, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aL9GurP5q2uc. 
151. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Kontorovich, supra 
note 83. 
152. The case concerned the murder of a fishing trawler captain by the disgruntled ship’s 
cook. See id. 
153. Bahar, supra note 91, at 48; David McKenzie, Somali Men Accused of Piracy Face 
January Trial, CNN.com, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/11/ 
kenya.piracytrial/index.html (quoting lawyer for suspected pirates captured by Britain and turned 
over to Kenya as arguing that his clients were fishing in Yemeni waters); Katharine Houreld, 
Suspected Somali Pirates Appear in Kenyan Court, ABC News, Apr. 23, 2009, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7407910. 
154. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Global Notice, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1. 
155. Suspected Pirates Face Trial, Kenya Broad. Corp., Dec. 11, 2008, 
http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?ID=54420. 
156. See Travis Kavulla, Prosecuting Captured Somali Pirates Poses Challenges, 
FoxNews.com, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,457827,00.html. 
KONTOROVICH 33 POSTAUTHOR 3/18/2010  8:36 AM 
264 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  98:243 
Such challenges must be taken seriously, because the alternative is the 
detention of innocent civilians.157 To be sure, treating the detainees as innocent 
fishermen would require giving credence to some dubious factual claims.158 
However, the same is true of many Guantánamo detainees captured in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere.159 They have claimed that they were innocent 
passersby,160 aid workers,161 tourists,162 minors,163 or simply ignorant of the 
nature and aims of the organization for which they worked.164 Regardless of 
their plausibility, these claims won significant sympathy for the detainees. 
Moreover, U.S. courts have held that because the power to detain depends on 
the foreigner’s status as a combatant, detainees can appear before tribunals to 
challenge the factual basis for being classified as a combatant even before a full 
trial for their alleged crimes.165 
In short, there are real difficulties in bringing a criminal case against 
armed foreigners seized in remote parts of the world. Evidentiary problems 
have already forced the U.S. Navy to release many of the pirates it seized in the 
wake of its January 2009 agreement with Kenya.166 Even though they were 
caught in response to a distress call from a commercial vessel, the evidence was 
“not ironclad.”167 Other nations also release pirates at a high rate because of 
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such concerns. 
2. Burdens of Trial 
Ensuring that suspected pirates have the normal rights of a defendant in a 
civilian trial would be particularly difficult given the remote location and 
nature of the alleged crime. Military personnel have little training in 
preservation and collection of evidence. For example, in the case of suspected 
pirates captured by a German warship, the captain ordered their skiff sunk and 
weapons dumped into the sea for security reasons, complicating the subsequent 
Kenyan prosecution.168 Transporting the prosecution, defendants, witnesses, 
and evidence to a foreign court would be burdensome and impede ongoing 
interdiction efforts.169 Identification by victims can be difficult, as the 
multinational crews of foreign-flagged vessels would have to be either detained 
or returned from their homes around the world. Otherwise, by the time the trial 
starts, the crew may be scattered around the world and simply unavailable.170 
For example, in the one SUA prosecution on record, the Shi case, the vessel 
was brought into a U.S. port and the entire crew held for months as material 
witnesses.171 Yet this is not a feasible solution for Somali piracy, because 
detaining crews would keep their vessels from continuing their voyages, 
paralyzing international commerce as much or more than the underlying piracy.  
Adding to the problem, domestic courts struggle to provide counsel and 
translation services in the defendants’ Somali dialect, even in neighboring 
Kenya.172 Providing translation services for testifying witnesses is also 
problematic, further complicated by the fact that they often hail from a variety 
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of distant countries.173 For example, in the Shi case, the United States obtained 
Mandarin translators for the entire crew of the victim vessel.174 Furthermore, 
naval officers in active service would be called upon repeatedly to testify, as 
the case would depend largely on the accounts of those present during the arrest 
of pirates.175 Given that such trials can take months, this would in effect require 
a dedicated cadre of officers.176  
3. Allegations of Abuse 
Kenyan prisons are at best grossly overcrowded and vermin infested.177 In 
the two cases brought in Kenyan courts so far at the behest of Western powers, 
the defendants alleged that they were tortured and denied religious privileges 
by their captors.178 Given that most Somalis are Muslim, there is always a 
danger that some elements might seize upon such allegations to incite anti-
Western sentiment like they did regarding incidents in Guantánamo where U.S. 
guards allegedly desecrated the Koran.179 Given the allegations of the Kenyan 
prisoners, it appears that some pirates are taking a page from the Guantánamo 
detainees’ playbook.180 Muslim leaders in Kenya have already likened the 
piracy prosecutions there to the War on Terror as another “pretext” for the 
government to “further engage in the human rights violation of Muslims.”181 
One can expect that if prosecution becomes more regular, claims of abuse will 
increase. Human rights groups have already started to raise these concerns. 
Recently, Ben Rawlence of Human Rights Watch said of the agreement with 
Kenya: “There is a very real risk that this agreement might be perceived as an 
attack on Muslims. Anything that the United States does is subject to a high 
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degree of suspicion.”182 Notwithstanding the truth of these allegations, they 
have negative consequences for detaining and capturing states. 
D. Pirates as Refugees 
Other human rights rules of Western countries increase the cost of 
arresting pirates to the apprehending nation, while decreasing the cost to the 
pirates themselves. For example, Britain reportedly instructed its ships not to 
capture pirates they encountered because they could claim asylum under EU 
human rights law once on board a British vessel, and certainly if brought to 
Britain for trial.183 Suspected pirates could quite plausibly claim that they 
would be subject to unfair trials, torture, and extrajudicial killing if they are 
repatriated to Somalia, where law and order have largely collapsed. Thus, they 
might be able to stay in a prosecuting country indefinitely if acquitted or upon 
their eventual release from prison. Obtaining residency in a Western nation 
would undoubtedly be seen as a benefit for most Somalis.184 Such “rewards” 
would only exacerbate the piracy problem.185 Any nation that has ratified the 
European Convention on Human Rights would have similar concerns. The 
United States is also a party to treaties that require granting asylum under 
certain circumstances, but the protections are not as broad as under European 
law.186 
E. Problems with Trial in Other Countries 
With none of the capturing countries wishing to prosecute under universal 
jurisdiction in their own courts, the only alternative to setting pirates free is 
transferring them to another country. Several states have taken this course, 
despite difficulties in finding a willing recipient state. Such renditions raise 
legal problems themselves. 
1. Nonrefoulement 
The most obvious nation to transfer captured Somali pirates to would be 
Somalia. Yet most countries do not see this as an option, both because of the 
lack of a functioning central government and the significant probability that the 
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transferee would be subject to unfair trials, cruel treatment, and the death 
penalty.187 Some European governments have expressed concern that 
repatriation would conflict with the sending state’s obligation of 
nonrefoulement under various international treaties.188 Nonrefoulement 
prohibits sending people to countries where they will likely be abused.189 The 
scope of this norm has been a major subject of debate in recent years regarding 
Guantánamo detainees, since terrorists, like pirates, often come from countries 
with deplorable human rights records. Yet France, one of the more active 
nations in the piracy campaign, regularly resorts to repatriation of pirates to 
Somalia, relying on assurances that they will not be tortured.190 Similarly, 
Denmark and Russia have handed over suspects to Yemen, another country 
with a terrible human rights record.191 
The United States and Europe have pursued another avenue—transferring 
suspected pirates to neighboring Kenya.192 While the alleged pirates have no 
connection to Kenya, they could be prosecuted there under universal 
jurisdiction. The advantages of such an arrangement for the sending states are 
obvious. Trials in Kenya proceed without the expansive protections of the 
European Convention on Human Rights or the U.S. Constitution, and would 
free the senders from some of the difficulties discussed in this Essay. The 
proceedings are relatively speedy and informal.193 
It is less obvious how Kenya benefits from such an arrangement. There 
appear to be implicit financial benefits. The EU, along with a U.N. agency, has 
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agreed to a comprehensive program of judicial assistance to cover the cost of 
pirate prosecutions.194 The program covers everything from salaries and travel 
to office equipment, prison refurbishing, and other investments in the Kenyan 
criminal justice system.195 Denmark, which signed its own agreement with 
Nairobi, has also promised to compensate Kenya for the current financial cost 
of the trials.196 Such assistance may go beyond covering Kenya’s actual costs. 
One might speculate that agreements with the United States contain similar 
understandings, or even promises of some kind of foreign aid.197  
Thus, the Kenya trials may be an example of economic efficiency in 
international jurisdiction.198 With this jurisdictional arbitrage, the international 
community steers cases to the cheapest plausibly competent forum, while 
sharing the resulting surplus with that state. Indeed, the EU involvement 
contemplates so much bottom-up institution and capacity building, funded by 
foreign sponsors, that Kenyan courts are becoming de facto, ad hoc 
international piracy tribunals of the kind some have called for.  
Turning Kenya into a clearinghouse for piracy trials also raises human 
rights concerns. While Kenya’s legal system is superior to that of many of its 
neighbors, it still has a huge backlog of cases and rampant corruption.199 
Shortly after the U.S. and EU piracy agreements were announced, the United 
Nations issued an extraordinary document calling for Kenya’s police chief and 
attorney general to step down because of their complicity in the murders of 
hundreds of people.200 Even as the United States relied on Kenya to prosecute 
the pirates it had captured, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the 
country for failing to control “ongoing corruption, impunity, politically 
motivated violence, human-rights abuses and a lack of respect for the rule of 
law.”201 The International Criminal Court has threatened to prosecute Kenyan 
leaders if the country does not establish a special tribunal to deal with the 
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bloody ethnic violence that occurred there in 2007.202 Much of the EU 
assistance to Kenya aims at ensuring trials and “detention conditions which 
meet international human rights standards.”203 Yet the EU will presumably not 
provide indefinite oversight of Kenyan prisons throughout the pirates’ 
incarceration. Thus, using Kenya as a go-to state for piracy prosecution 
suggests the United States and Europe will trade some prisoner security for 
convenience and expedience. Such tradeoffs proved highly controversial in the 
context of the War on Terror.204 It seems the Western public is not as 
concerned with such issues in relation to suspected pirates.205 
2. UNCLOS Article 105 
The Kenyan arrangement may be further complicated by an obscure 
clause in UNCLOS Article 105. Though the relevant language has never been 
judicially construed,206 it arguably casts doubt on the permissibility of universal 
jurisdiction by states other than the one that captured the pirates. The article, 
which codifies universal jurisdiction over piracy, provides that “every State 
may seize a pirate ship” on “the high seas, or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.” While “every” state may seize pirates, Article 105 
provides that the prosecution should be by “the courts of the state which carried 
out the seizure.”207 The drafting history supports the reading that the article 
precludes transfers to third-party states.208 
To be sure, the possibility of such transfers never occurred to the drafters, 
who thought large-scale high seas piracy a thing of the past. This underscores 
the uncertainties that arise when courts must fit new security challenges into 
international instruments that embody older paradigms.209 While Article 105 is 
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unlikely in practice to hamstring the Kenyan prosecutions, the uncertain 
language may make other third-party states hesitant to accept such cases.210 
Although UNCLOS does not explicitly authorize prosecution by third-
party states, it does not expressly prohibit the practice.211 Article 105 could be 
read to mean that states may not try pirates onboard the captured vessel. 
According to the preceding article, Article 104,212 pirated ships retain their 
nationality—a change from prior customary law. Read together with Article 
105, this would make them an improper venue for trial.213 While this reading is 
plausible, it is not clear whether a court martial on board a seized pirated ship, 
as opposed to onboard the arresting one, was ever so common a practice to 
warrant explicit disapproval in articles that otherwise say nothing about the 
details of prosecution. There is nothing in the drafting history of the provision, 
which was taken directly from the 1958 Law of the Sea treaty, to support this 
interpretation.214 
In short, the text of UNCLOS muddies the question of third-state 
jurisdiction.215 The problems posed by UNCLOS help explain the emphasis 
that military and diplomatic officials have been placing on SUA,216 which 
allows any signatory state with personal jurisdiction over a defendant to 
prosecute.217 While there is no state practice explicitly elucidating the 
provision, in the Somali context, most states have not adopted the limited 
reading of Article 105. This can be inferred from the transfer deals between 
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Kenya and numerous countries, to which there has been little or no objection on 
Article 105 grounds. Yet given that in the current situation no state has any 
self-interested reason for raising such objections (given their unwillingness to 
try the detainees domestically), such an argument would most probably first be 
made—and may yet be made—as a challenge to Kenya’s jurisdiction by the 
defendants on trial there.  
One way of reconciling the article’s language and current practice would 
be to conclude that UNCLOS, and Article 105 in particular, does not preempt 
or displace preexisting customary law, which may have given universal 
jurisdiction authority to any state. (If the authority of jurisdiction of third states 
comes from custom rather than treaty, this may have implications for their 
ability to prosecute under their domestic law.) If Kenya’s jurisdiction comes 
from custom, one would have to consider the current custom in modern 
universal jurisdiction cases regarding which nation should exercise universal 
jurisdiction.218 Modern practice and theory suggests a state with some 
connection to the offender or conduct should prosecute over a state with no 
connection.219  
A limitation of universal jurisdiction to the capturing state would not be 
anomalous as a policy matter. Apart from nations with traditional jurisdiction, 
that state would usually have the greatest connection to the offense. The 
purpose of universal jurisdiction is to enable nations that encounter suspected 
pirates not to limit their enforcement efforts out of jurisdictional concerns. If 
nations that make the arrest are unwilling to prosecute, then releasing the 
defendant may be a proper outcome—a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Auctioning prosecution to the lowest bidder, while defensible, can 
also raise concerns about due process and related issues. 
F. Inconsistent Assertions of Universal Jurisdiction 
Prosecuting pirates may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Western 
nations do not hesitate to bring charges against Somalis that attack220 their own 
vessels. Indeed, European nations have used universal jurisdiction to prosecute 
other crimes, such as war crimes and torture. Because these offenses, unlike 
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piracy, take place entirely within the territory of foreign countries and often 
involve governmental actors as defendants, they raise even greater difficulties 
for putting together a trial. European countries’ avoidance of universal 
jurisdiction over pirates, even when they actually have the pirates in custody, 
raises questions about why they are willing to use it in what might seem more 
difficult and politicized cases. Under the slogan “an end to impunity,” universal 
jurisdiction seeks to address some of the most bloody wars, genocides, and 
intractable ethnic conflict in the world.221 European countries have launched 
prosecutions against political and military leaders of various distant 
countries.222 
Yet the countries at the forefront of expanding universal jurisdiction will 
not use it to prosecute piracy even though it means allowing a major 
international problem to go on unchecked. For example, Denmark has said that 
it cannot punish pirates it captures.223 Yet it was one of the first European 
countries to prosecute Serb officers for crimes committed against Bosnian 
Muslims in the Yugoslav civil war.224 Similarly, when the Spanish Navy 
captured a group of suspected Somali pirates, a judge ordered them released on 
the grounds that prosecuting a crime that occurred thousands of miles away 
would be “a bit disproportionate.”225 Just a week before, another Spanish 
magistrate had launched an investigation into an Israeli strike on a Hamas 
leader in Gaza in 2002.226  
Ironically, Spain lacked personal jurisdiction over the Israeli officials, 
unlike the pirates.227 Moreover, the evidentiary and other practical issues seem 
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much more daunting when it comes to discerning what happened years ago in 
an ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, a situation in which, 
unlike piracy, some of the alleged victims are actively involved in the conflict 
and collecting evidence and testimony is inherently politicized. Additionally, 
unlike with Gulf of Aden piracy, Spain has not been involved in keeping Gaza 
safe; its judicial interest is unlinked to enforcement activities. Using universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in politically fraught Gaza while rejecting it for 
piracy is like a district attorney prosecuting only high-profile celebrity cases, 
while letting ordinary murder and robbery go unpunished.  
G. Summary 
Capturing pirates raises a host of legal problems. If prosecution appears to 
be a bad option—because of a lack of evidence, the cost of presenting the 
evidence, the danger of asylum requests, or the strain on military operations—
the captor must then figure out what to do with the pirate. In the meantime, the 
detaining power is stuck holding the foreign citizen captured abroad without 
trial. In the shadow of Guantánamo, which turned the detention and potential 
trial of alleged combatants into one of the most politically explosive issues of 
the day, it is understandable that nations choose to ignore their international 
obligation to fight piracy. Yet the same nations’ willingness to use universal 
jurisdiction in more politically sensitive and legally difficult cases raises 
questions about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in universal jurisdiction 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the international response to piracy is a cautionary tale 
about the limits of international law. It is not that treating pirates as ordinary 
criminals has proven ineffective. Rather, nations think it would be so difficult 
to bring these criminals to justice that they are not interested in even trying. Or, 
to put it differently, while the crime is nominally an injury to all countries and 
the international legal order, individual states perceive few benefits to 
enforcing the norm themselves. Indeed, nations treat any option as superior to 
trials in capturing nations’ domestic courts: countries have experimented with 
renditions to poor third-countries, sought authorization for military strikes, 
discussed creating a new specialized international court, and even released 
pirates shortly after their capture. 
Ironically, many commentators have claimed that some problems of 
dealing with international terrorists could be partially resolved by giving them 
the legal status of pirates.228 They argue that just as international law allows 
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universal jurisdiction over pirates—violent nonstate actors with transborder 
operations—it should extend universal jurisdiction to terrorists. The longstand-
ing status of piracy as the paradigmatic international crime made it seem a safe 
model to extend to a more difficult context. But while the treatment of piracy 
does have lessons for the War on Terror, they are not lessons for emulation. 
Even as international law has progressed, it has developed in such a way 
that it cannot respond effectively to an atavism like piracy. Further, the 
difficulties of prosecuting pirates are likely minimal compared to those 
difficulties involved in prosecuting trained terrorists. The piracy problem raises 
questions about the ability of the liberal international law regime to deal with 
organized and violent transnational networks. The purely military justice model 
for prosecuting hostile foreign irregulars that Guantánamo came to symbolize 
has proven politically unacceptable in the United States and other Western 
democracies. Yet the current piracy efforts suggest the great practical 
difficulties in applying a civilian enforcement model to a large number of 
individuals. The unattractiveness of either option suggests that many of the 
foundational instruments of modern international law need retooling to meet 
changing threats. If international justice fails against “criminal activity by 
lightly armed thugs deployed from small boats and fishing vessels,”229 it will be 
hard for it to deter more formidable wrongdoers. If a small number of robbers 
cannot be brought to the bar of international justice, the war criminals of the 
world have little to worry about. 
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